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MetanormativeTheory and the
Meaning of Deontic Modals
Matthew Chrisman
 Introduction
Metanormative theory is, in part, about the meaning of sentences such as “One ought
always act for reasons for which one could consistently allow everyone else to act as
well,” and “One should proportion degree of belief solely in accordance with evidence.”
There are other normative terms, of course, but ‘ought’ (≈ ‘should’), is clearly one of
the handful of core normative terms, and I will focus on it here.1
Given this focus, here is a way to put an idea that I think many philosophers
find attractive: ought-claims prescribe possible action, thought, and feeling, rather
than describing how things actually stand in reality. Arguably, this idea underwrites
the popularity of the is/ought divide, explains some of the attraction in Moore’s
Open Question Argument, and motivates some of the interest philosophers have had
in noncognitivist, emotivist, prescriptivist, projectivist, and expressivist accounts of
normative thought and discourse.
Here is another popular line of thought that has sometimes seemed to be in tension
with that initial idea: A central part of the best overall account of the meaning of
declarative sentences will explain how their truth conditions can be derived from the
semantic values of their basic components and their logical form. The word ‘ought’
can, of course, figure in nondeclarative sentences, but the ought-sentences primarily
at issue in metanormative theory are grammatically declarative. This implies that
our overall theory of meaning should provide a compositional assignment of truth
conditions to ought-sentences as a part of its treatment of declarative sentences more
generally. This seems necessary for accounting for the fact that it is obviously mean-
ingful to embed ought-sentences in propositional contexts, such as under the truth
1 Returning only very briefly at the end to reflect on the broader issue of howmy conclusions here might
bear on similar issues regarding other normative and evaluative vocabulary.
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predicate, under epistemic modals, in the antecedent of conditionals, in disjunctions,
or in the context of “S believes/knows/doubts/fears/hopes that . . .,” etc.
One reason this line of thought has seemed in tension with the distinction many
philosophers have wanted to draw between ‘is’ and ‘ought’ is that proponents of the
most prominent family of antirealist metanormative views have sometimes suggested
that normative sentences including ought-sentences are not truth-apt. Or they have
suggested that normative sentences have truth conditions but only in a “deflationary
sense” supposedly incompatible without reliance on truth conditions for substantive
and informative explanations of the meanings of these sentences.
However, it’s important not to underestimate the challenges facing this idea.
Ought-sentences embed just like other declaratives in propositional contexts, and
our best account of the compositional function of these other declarative sentences
is (arguably) one that seeks a perspicuous display of the functional interaction of the
nodes of the correct tree-like representation of the logical formof each sentence, where
these functions are ultimately functions from the semantic values of the parts of the
sentence to the value true—that is to say, a theory which assigns truth conditions
to these sentences. Any theory that would propose otherwise for ought-sentences is
under extremely strong pressure to propose otherwise for all declarative sentences. At
this level of generality, however, the truth-conditionalist approach to the semantics
of declarative sentences is widely (though not universally2) assumed to be the best
game in town for articulating the compositional structure of declarative sentences.
This is why many philosophers are strongly inclined to think we should assign ought-
sentences truth conditions, and not as a mere deflationary afterthought but as a
central part of the explanation of how their meaning is a function of the meanings
of their parts.
Does that mean we have to choose: either accept the Herculean task of developing
a new approach to compositional semantics that eschews the successes of truth-
conditionalist approaches even for nonnormative language or treat ought-claims as
describing reality after all (and “locate” the normative properties that would make
sense of that)? Here, I want to argue against thinking that this is an important choice
point at the intersection of metanormative theory and compositional semantics. To
that end, I pursue three main tasks in this chapter. First, I explain a specific version
of the semantic rule for ‘ought’ that I favor. This is a refinement of the standard
treatment of ‘ought’ as a context-sensitive necessity modal. Secondly, I explain two
ways we might interpret the results of truth-conditional semantics: a more familiar
“representationalism” and a less familiar “inferentialism.” I view these as different
2 Nothing I say in this paperwill engage substantivelywith the question ofwhether a truth-conditionalist
approach to compositional semantics is preferable in general to some dynamic alternative such as one
based on Discourse Representation Theory (Kamp, ), File Change Semantics (Heim, ), or Update
Semantics (Veltman, , ). Here I shall simply assume (alongwithmostmetanormative theorists) that
a truth-conditionalist approach is the default position for nonnormative declaratives, and so the interesting
question is what to make of the fact that it is also appropriate for normative declaratives.
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kinds of metasemantic accounts of what it is in virtue of which declarative sentences
have the contents that they do.3 , 4 I want to explain these views in order to argue that,
withmy semantic rule for ‘ought’ in hand, bothmetasemantic accounts can respect the
apparent prescriptivity of (some) ought-claims and both can accept relatively standard
compositional truth conditions for ought-claims without committing to the idea that
these claims describe how things actually are in reality.What distinguishes them is how
they respect these ideas, not whether they can do so. Finally, I discuss the “ideational-
ist” thesis that sentences are primarily vehicles for expressing our ideas and so get their
truth conditions from their conventional expressive potentials.This may be an attrac-
tive home for some sophisticated contemporary expressivist views in metanormative
theory. I compare them with inferentialism because I think it is not completely clear
how such sophisticated versions of expressivism fit in. Depending on how they are
developed, theymight be viewed as compatible with and so perhaps usefully combined
with inferentialism; or they might constitute a third competing metasemantic view.
I hope that comparison of aspects of this somewhat more familiar view to the
inferentialist view I develop earlier in the chapter will help to clarify what is at stake.
 ‘Ought’ and Truth Conditions
Aswithmany othermodal auxiliary verbs in English, ought-sentences come in diverse
flavors, e.g.
3 By using language of “in virtue of ” here, I mean to indicate that they are very general grounding
explanations that seek to identify the kinds of nonsemantic facts that undergird the semantic facts postulated
by empirical semantics. Compare Charlow (a, p. ) and Yalcin (, p. ). Some (e.g. Speaks, )
may prefer the term “foundational theory of meaning” or “theory of the foundations of meaning” for what I
am calling metasemantics. Yalcin () surveys arguments for a distinction between content and semantic
value, where the former is (at least) what is said by uses of a sentence and what grounds the intentionality
and causal efficacy of mental states expressed by such uses, and the latter is what is attributed to sentences to
explain various semantic facts, e.g. about productivity of language, entailment relations between sentences,
the un/acceptability or un/interpretability of particular sentences, etc. Given this distinction, there are two
domains about which we might ask second-order questions: we can ask about what it is in virtue of which
speech-acts and the mental states they express have the contents that they do, and we can ask about what
it is in virtue of which sentences have the semantic values that they do. While I am highly sympathetic to
this distinction, observing it in what follows would have unnecessarily complicated an already complicated
discussion. It may be the case that representationalism and inferentialism are best viewed as second-order
accounts of content rather than—or at least in addition to—semantic value. However, I write here under
the simplifying assumption that “metasemantics” is about what I sometimes call “semantic content,” which
is meant to cover both.
4 Perez Carballo () usefully distinguishes a “hermeneutic” question about how to interpret the
formal specifications of truth conditions in truth-conditional semantics from an “explanatory” question
about what it is that explains the (approximate) correctness of the formal specifications of truth conditions
for a sentence. I agree that these are distinct, but I also think the metasemantic views I will discuss here are
all at a high enough level of generality that they can be seen as offering package answers to these questions.
I’mmainly interested in the explanatory question, but sometimes I will ask about howwe are to interpret the
results of truth-conditional semantics. By this, I don’t mean just what hermeneutic gloss of the formalism
is appropriate but also what underlying facts about language and language users explain what it is in virtue
of which sentences have the truth conditions that they have.
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() We ought to do more to relieve great suffering.
() Bob ought to give up smoking.
() To support a loft-bed in plaster walls, anchor bolts rather than screws ought to
be used.
() Larry, who has had the most unfortunate time of things recently, ought to win
the lottery.
() The storm ought to hit shore before midnight.
In light of this diversity, semanticists typically treat ‘ought’ as a flexible necessitymodal
and give its semantics in terms of a universal quantification over possible worlds. For
example, they might use a rule something like:
Modal Rule: [[ought p]]fg = T iff for all w ∈Wfg , w ∈ p
which says that an ought-sentence is true just in case its prejacent p is true at each
possible world in some contextually determined set W (usually, the set of worlds
consistent with some set of background conditions f and highly ranked by some
ordering function>g).5
This rule is attractive for the way it generates decent interpretations of all of the
examples ()–() above without positing lexical ambiguity (which is good since the
diversity of flavors of modal verbs is cross-linguistically robust, suggesting that ‘ought’
has univocalmeaning). In each case, the difference in flavor is explained as a difference
in the contextual determination of the set of worlds quantified over. As long as context
can determine different values for f and g to input into the modal rule, we can provide
a very systematic interpretation of diverse ought-sentences.
Some metaethicists may be tempted to suggest an old-school reductive analysis of
‘ought’ in terms of obligations, fittingness, or reasons. However, without prejudicing
the separate issue of whether our ought-concept is constitutively connected to these
5 This is a simplified version of the rule predicted by Kratzer () for necessity modals. In addition to
the fact that it suppresses world-relativity of semantic values and elides the distinction between sentences
of the object language and metalinguistic variables, it also prescinds from the interesting issue of how
to account for ‘ought’s apparent weakness compared to ‘must’. Kratzerian proposals for handling this are
explored in Fintel and Iatridou (), Swanson (), and Silk (). Wertheimer (), Finlay (),
and Portner and Rubinstein () make somewhat different proposals, which are nonetheless consistent
with the basic idea that ‘ought’ is a necessity modal and to be modeled in terms of a universal quantification
over a set of worlds. Here I will also suppress the fascinating question of how (if at all) this rule should
be modified to handle the distinction between the objective ‘ought’ of what’s actually best and the so-
called subjective ‘ought’ of what best optimizes ones choices given imperfect information and varying
standards for practical decisions. For discussion, see Kolodny andMacFarlane (), Björnsson and Finlay
(), Dowell (), Cariani (), Charlow (), Carr (), Silk (), Bronfman andDowell (),
Wedgwood (). Furthermore, there are other metaethically important challenges to this semantics that
will remain off stage here. For instance, the standard account also has difficulty with sentences of the form
“If p, then it ought to be the case that p” (see Zvolenszky, ; Carr, ). It seems to rule out strong
ought-dilemmas by semantic fiat rather than philosophical argument. See Swanson () and Fintel ()
for discussion. I think each of these problems can be addressed within a broadly intensional semantics for
‘ought’, which is all I really need for my argumentative purposes below; but I won’t discuss this further here.
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other concepts in important ways, we should recognize that the modal rule’s ability to
provide such a systematic treatment of sentences as diverse as ()–() without positing
lexical ambiguity is an impressive feat—arguably one that any semantic analysis of
‘ought’ in terms of obligations, fittingness, reasons, or what’s best will fail to do.6
Nevertheless, I still believe there is a lessonproponents of themodal rulemight learn
from the urge amongst metanormative theorists to connect ‘ought’ to notions such as
obligations, fittingness, or reasons. Ought-sentences seem, when used in the sense that
is of most interest in metanormative theory, to call on agents to do something; and
arguably this is a more fine-grained notion than a proposition’s being true at possible
worlds. Here is Geach in a classical statement of the objection:
If the deontic operator applied to whole propositions, then the results of modifying the
active and the equivalent passive form with an ‘ought’ must likewise be equivalent. But such
equivalences often appear not to hold. ‘John beats up Tom’ and ‘Tom is beaten up by John’ are
equivalent; but it looks as though ‘John ought to beat up Tom’ and ‘Tom ought to be beaten up
by John’ are not necessarily equivalent. (, p. )
In light of this good point, rather than abandoning the modal rule altogether,7 I think
we should enhance it by integrating it with a semantics for imperatives. After all, saying
that S ought to φ—in the sense of most interest in metanormative theory—seems
closely related to issuing the imperative, “S φ!”
Howmight we enhance themodal rule in away that respects this connection?Here’s
a start: Formally, semantic models typically assign declarative contents (propositions)
truth values relative to points of evaluation, which are conceived as (at least) possible
worlds (which in turnmight be thought of in a variety of ways, e.g. as concrete possible
universes, abstract ways reality could be, sets of propositions, or something else). As
far as formal semantics goes, we might also want to assign imperative contents (what
I’ll call “prescriptions”) a kind of semantic value relative to a point of evaluation—
after all, imperatives are also logically-composed sentences of language standing in
semantic relations such as entailment and equivalence to other sentences—but the
kind of semantic value and the conception of the point of evaluation has to be
different (since imperatives do not seem to have truth values).8 One proposal that I
like assigns imperatives the semantic values legitimate/illegitimate relative to possible
norms (which in turn might be thought of in a variety of ways, e.g. as concrete laws of
6 I consider various attempts to reductively analyze ‘ought’ in these terms in chapter  of Chrisman
(); the main stumbling block is plausibly capturing the meaning of epistemic ought-sentences such as
() while retaining a plausible treatment of paradigmatic normative ought-sentences such as () and ().
7 Schroeder () argues that it motivates treating ‘ought’ as ambiguous between raising-verb and
control-verb readings. I discuss this proposal and show why it isn’t linguistically motivated in Chrisman
(a). See also Finlay and Snedegar () for pragmatic explanations of many of the phenomena that
lead Schroeder to posit ambiguity.
8 A point which is argued for in greater detail in Charlow (b, section ), Starr (, section ), and
Chrisman and Hubbs (unpublished, section ).
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possible practices, abstract ways agents might behave, sets of general prescriptions, or
something else).9
It is not important here whether this is the right semantics for imperatives, but if
we posit the imagined prescriptional contents with legitimacy values rather than truth
values, thenwe can embed this in our semantics for ‘ought’ by adopting something like
the following as a new general rule articulating the truth-conditional contribution of
‘ought’:
Enhanced Modal Rule: [[ought p]]fg = T iff for all<w, n> ∈ Pfg ,<w, n> ∈ p
Here we no longer restrict p to propositions that might be expressed by declarative
sentences and modeled as a set of possible worlds; instead we allow that it could also
be the sorts of prescriptions that might be expressed by imperative sentences, and we
model it in general as a set of world-norm pairs (the worlds where the prescription is
legitimate relative to the norm).This rule says that an ought-sentence is true10 just in
case its prejacent is correct relative to each member of some contextually determined
set of world-norm pairs. This means, if we allow that the prejacent p could be either
propositional or prescriptional, we get two species of ought-claims out of a univocal
semantic rule. When the prejacent is propositional, the rule works similarly to the one
above: the ought-sentence is true just in case the prejacent is true relative to each of
some contextually determined set of world-norm pairs, where the norm parameter
is usually idle. By contrast, when the prejacent is practical, the rule evaluates its
legitimacy relative to each of some contextually determined set of world-norm pairs,
where the norm parameter is usually crucial.11
9 CompareCastañeda (, chapters –) for themost detailedway ofworking out this basic idea about
imperatives (but note that he uses the term “prescription” in a different way to how I am here). Charlow
(b) defends a related idea in an expressivistic framework which treats imperatives and declaratives as
having properties of representations of states of mind as their semantic values, where ordinary declaratives
denote properties of representations of beliefs and imperatives denote properties of representations of
preferences.Hauser (), Segerberg (), Portner (), andHanks (, chapter ) defend competing
views about the semantic value of imperatives that can still be used to generate sentence-level contents
that are not propositions, which in turn can be thought to be embedded under ‘ought’s. In Chrisman and
Hubbs (unpublished), we show how treating such nonpropositional contents as the semantic values of
imperatives can be motivated by action-theoretic considerations ancillary to the project of compositional
semantics. As indicated above, what is crucial here is not the correctness of this approach to the semantics
of imperatives but rather that it can handle the content embedded under prescriptive-seeming ‘ought’s. A
perhaps more orthodox view is that imperatives have action-related properties as their contents and their
semantic relations to other sentences are derivative of the semantic relations between the propositions that
result from ascribing these properties to individuals. I think this view has trouble explaining the semantic
difference between necessarily coextensive but nonsynonymous imperatives, and I doubt that it gets the
logic of imperatives right. But that doesn’t matter here since I am not relying on the view of prescriptions
above as the right view of the content of imperatives.
10 Ought-sentences are clearly declaratives and so they get truth values and have truth conditions on this
view. Although this treatment of their truth conditions allows that they can embed prejacents which are not
truth-apt, this is not a version of the failed noncognitivist idea that ought-sentences are neither true nor
false.
11 This bears some similarity to the proposal developed in Gibbard (, chapter ) and Gibbard (,
chapters. –) to extend the standard possible-world semantics, adding an extra norm-index relative to
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With a rule such as this one, I think we overcome the worry from Geach about
applying truth-conditional semantics to ‘ought.’The prescriptions John, beat up Tom!
andTom, be beaten up by John! are different from each other (and from the proposition
that John beats up Tom); they could easily differ in whether they are legitimate relative
to a norm.The enhancedmodal rule lets us understand the truth conditions of ought-
sentences in terms of a universal quantification over a contextually determined set of
possibilia.12 Even within a univocal treatment, we can recognize an important seman-
tic difference between obviously propositional ought-sentences, such as () and (),
and obviously prescriptional ought-sentences, such as () and (). It may be less clear
where other ought-sentences fall in respect of this divide, but that is plausibly because
determining this requires more information about the context in which they are used.
In any case, the enhanced modal rule is the rule articulating ‘ought’s contribution
to truth conditions that I will use in the rest of this paper. As I indicated above,
I will not provide any more argument for this semantics of ‘ought’ than is already
in the barebones explanation of the rule, and I fully grant that further refinements
of it are needed for various purposes in semantics. My purpose in explaining it
is mainly to frame the question I want to pursue in the rest of this paper: how
should we interpret this rule? Recall at the outset I suggested that a central debate
in metanormative theory seems to be pulled in two directions based on whether one
takes more seriously the idea that ‘ought’s (at least the ones relevant to metanormative
theory) are distinctively prescriptive, or the idea that all declarative sentences should
be given a truth-conditionalist semantics. With something like the enhanced modal
rule in hand, I think we can see this to be a false choice by exploring two different
metasemantic accounts of what this rule tells us about the facts in virtue of which
ought-sentences have the contents that they do. Both of these accounts are consistent
with the idea that some ought-claims function not as descriptions of what is actually
the case but rather prescriptions for what someone is to do in various circumstances.
The interesting question is how they differ in capturing this idea.
 Truth Conditions as Ways Reality Could Be
The first account stems from what I take to be a pervasive view in contemporary
philosophy.This is that declarative sentences have the contents that they do in virtue
which some sentences could be evaluated. However, Gibbard uses this extension to provide semantic values
for declarative sentences with normative elements, in essence committing to either a kind of noncognitivism
or a kind of norm-relativism about the possibility of true normative declaratives. By contrast, I’m applying
this idea only to nonpropositional contents, like those we might assign to imperatives, which I deny are
truth-apt and for which I think it is much more plausible to assign some kind of semantic value other than
truth.
12 An alternative attempt to do this posits elided “stits” (“sees-to-it-that”) in the prejacent proposition
of ‘ought’s intuitively thought to be practical. As a semantic proposal, I think this is ad hoc and non-
explanatory. But arguing for that is not necessary to the points I want to make here.
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of how they represent reality as being. To see how this works, consider first a simple
sentence, such as
() Grass is green.
It is very tempting to think that sentences such as this one are true just in case reality
is the way they represent it as being. That is to say, e.g., that () represents grass as
having the property of being green. Generalizing from this example, it is tempting
to think that pursuit of a truth-conditional semantics boils down to the development
of a recursive method for spelling out the way reality would have to be in order for
each declarative sentence of the language to be true. Using the terminology I prefer,
we can call this a representationalist explanation of truth conditions. Arguably, it is a
core assumption of all traditional realist and error-theoretic views in metaethics.They
would say that
() Stealing is wrong.
is true just in case reality is the way () represents it as being. Then there is room
for debate among these philosophers about the nature of this putative piece of
reality (naturalism vs nonnaturalism) and whether it actually obtains (success-theory
vs. error-theory).
The pervasiveness of this representationalist interpretation of truth-conditional
semantics can help to make some sense of why anyone would have ever denied,
as early noncognitivists did, that normative sentences have truth conditions. For,
on the face of things, it seems obvious that some normative sentences are true and
others are false; and from the point of view of ordinary language, embedding ethical
sentences such as () under the truth predicate and other propositional contexts
such as belief/knowledge attributions and epistemic modals seems beyond reproach.
However, if your view is that normative language at its base is prescriptive rather than
descriptive, and you accept (at least tacitly) the representationalist conception of what
truth-conditional semantics is telling us, then you might be tempted to argue that
normative sentences do not have truth conditions (at least not in any theoretically
interesting sense).
Below I’ll suggest that there’s away that even thosemetanormative theorists inspired
by noncognitivism can resist this temptation—as they should, since it is difficult to
see any hope of realizing the aspirations of compositional semantics if we pursue
a bifurcated approach to semantics, using truth conditions as our basic semantic
framework for nonnormative sentences such as () but something else for normative
sentences such as ().13 But before we get there, I want to explain why I think the
metanormative situationwith respect to ‘ought’ complicates things in a way that allows
13 This is the main lesson of Hale (), Dreier (), Unwin (). Schroeder () shows how
difficult it is for an expressivist to avoid this even by advancing a psychologistic semantics across the board,
i.e. applied also to paradigmatically descriptive sentences.
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even the hardcore representationalist to accept, indeed to champion the idea that
normative language (at least insofar as it is “fraught with ought”) is prescriptive rather
than descriptive, undercutting some of the traditional noncognitivist motivation for
denying that normative sentences have truth conditions.
Here’s why things are more complicated. Even if you accept the representationalist
conception of truth conditions in the basic case, you will want to allow there are some
declarative sentences that do something other than describe what is actually the case.
This is because some sentences are formed with intensional operators, e.g.
() Jack and Mary might be in the house.
And intensional operators do not seem to function like normal predicates. Instead,
they are generally thought by semanticists to serve the purpose of shifting some
parameter of the circumstance relative to which we evaluate the content that they
embed.That is, for instance, they tell us to evaluate some embedded proposition not
at the actual world but at some possible world(s). For example, the idea is to think of
() as true just in case the embedded proposition that Jack and Mary are in the house
is true in some world regarded as possible given a particular body of evidence.This is
why its truth conditions are usually given with something like the following:
[[()]]c = T iff [[Jack and Mary are in the house]]c = T in some possible world
consistent with our evidence in this world
As a working hypothesis, this is all relatively familiar from textbook treatments of
intensional operators in semantics.14 It may need to be refined, but the important
question at this stage is not semantic butmetasemantic:What is the representationalist
gloss of these truth conditions? One fairly natural thing for the representationalist to
say is that these truth conditions tell us how this sentence represents reality as being,
but the piece of reality it represents is more complicated than anything having to do
merely with what is actually the case.The thought is that () represents how things are
not just in the actual world but also in other possible worlds; this involves representing
some kind of relation between possible worlds. So, if we assume an ontology of
possible worlds,15 we can continue to think of all declarative sentences, even those
formed by intensional operators, as representing ways reality could be. But (here’s the
payoff) we can simultaneously deny that all declarative sentences describe how things
actually are. For on this view some sentences represent a piece of reality that involves
14 Not that it is uncontroversial. Even Kratzer () recognizes that its application to epistemic modals
faces challenges making sense of apparent disagreement, which has led some to follow MacFarlane ()
in complicating the definition of truth for such claims, relativizing to a context of assessment; but see von
Fintel and Gillies (, ) for criticism and a more conservative response.
15 What about linguistic Ersatz-theorists who reject the reality of possible worlds but contend that some
other part of our ontology can play the role of possible worlds in our interpretation of the truth conditions
of modal sentences? Whether they count as representationalists in the sense I’m trying to capture here is
going to depend on how exactly they conceive of the other part of our ontology as playing the role of possible
worlds.
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a relation between the actual world and other merely possible worlds. Hence, on the
representationalist interpretation of the standard truth-conditionalist semantics for
them, might-sentences are no mere description of how things actually are.
 Application to ‘Ought’
I hope it’s already clear that this is relevant to the apparent tension between the
idea that ‘ought’s do not describe what is actually the case but prescribe possible
action, thought, and feeling, and the idea that all declarative sentences deserve the
same general semantic treatment, e.g. in terms of compositionally specified truth
conditions. Even if we just use the simple modal rule for ‘ought,’ it can be viewed like
‘might’ as a device for shifting some parameter of the circumstance relative to which
we evaluate the propositions it embeds rather than for describing some feature of
what is actually the case.Then, representationalists will interpret the truth conditions
this rule predicts for ought-sentences as specifying how the sentences represent a
complex modal feature of reality as being—not as merely describing how things
actually are.16 But more to the point, if we use the enhanced modal rule, I think the
representationalist can even capture an important sense in which at least some ‘ought’s
are prescriptive rather than descriptive. For example, we can use this rule to interpret
() Jack and Mary ought to leave.
predicting the following truth conditions:
[[()]]fg = T iff [[Jack and Mary, leave!]] = L in for all< wn >∈ Pfg
This means that () is true just in case its prejacent prescription is legitimate relative
to all of the relevant points of evaluation (in this case world-norm pairs highly
ranked by >g that are consistent with background conditions f ). Then, assuming
an ontology of possible worlds and possible norms, representationalists can interpret
these truth conditions as representing a modally complex way reality could be: a way
the actual world is related to possible worlds and possible norms. More specifically,
representationalists will think the formula above tells us that the prescription for Jack
and Mary to leave is legitimate across a contextually determined range of possible
norms in light of the circumstances common in a contextually determined range of
possible worlds. In this way, () is assigned truth conditions, but since these are truth
conditions involving what is prescribed by norms in various possible worlds, this
16 So it’s possible to reject my suggestion that ‘ought’s can embed prescriptive prejacents and still buy
the rest of what I say here as long as there’s an alternative way to capture the prescriptivity of some ‘ought’s.
Some may be inclined to do this by treating one of the ordering sources evoked by ‘ought’ (according to
the modal rule) as ordering worlds in terms of whether some set of prescriptions is satisfied. I think this is
going to be too coarse-grained to respect Geach’s point from above, but a lot will depend on how we work
out the details of prescriptive ordering sources.
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sentence can be recognized as prescriptive rather than descriptive of what is actually
the case.
So, if that representationalist story is on the right track, then it’s wrong to thinkwe’re
forced to choose between a truth-conditionalist approach to semantics and the idea
that ought-sentences are often prescriptive rather than descriptive of what is actually
the case. By conceiving of ought-sentences as representing a complex modal piece of
reality, involving possible norms and what they prescribe in various possible worlds,
this apparent dilemma is avoided.
It is avoided, we should note, by divorcing the notions of describing what’s actually
the case and representing reality, allowing that the truth conditions of some sentences
(at least those involving intensional operators) tell us that these sentences have the
contents that they do in virtue of representing more than what is actually the case.
They represent something like merely possible worlds and merely possible norms and
their relations to the actual world. Hence, the representationalist way of avoiding the
dilemma comes with ontological (and associated epistemological) costs.
This is a familiar worry in metanormative theory, but I think the representationalist
interpretation of a workable truth-conditional semantics for ‘might’ or ‘ought’ reveals
how it extends into the metaphysics of modality. By treating intensional operators as
generating representations of reality, the articulation of their truth conditions gestured
at abovewould force us to understand anyone committed to the truth of sentences such
as () or () as committed to the reality of possible worlds and possible norms (or their
ersatz-replacements). Are the merely possible worlds, e.g. where there are dragons in
the command of a princess, and themerely possible norms, e.g. which require dragons
to blow fire on the princess’s enemies, just as real as the greenness of grass or the
location of people in the house? Once in the representationalist mindset, it may be
difficult to see how the answer could be anything other than “yes”; but taking a step
back, many metanormative theorists are going to worry that this is an ontologically
profligate position affronting to common sense about the difference between what
is real and what is imaginary/virtual/fictional/merely-possible (not to mention the
more theory-laden distinction between what is the case in reality and what reality
might/ought/etc. to be like).17
Perhaps this ontological cost (and any related epistemological costs) should be paid.
I’d certainly be willing to pay provided it was required to get the benefits of system-
aticity and seamlessness provided by truth-conditionalist approaches to compositional
semantics. Below, however, I want to suggest that there are alternative metasemantic
accounts of the results of compositional semantics—ones not committed to the idea
that ought-sentences represent a (complex modal) way reality could be. I think this
17 Are these things perhaps real but not “just as real” as the greenness of grass or the location of people
in the house, because they are abstract? I doubt that the distinction between concrete and abstract elements
of reality helps here, as many of the things we probably want to say are “more real” than possible worlds and
possible norms would, on many ways of drawing this divide, count as abstract.
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coheres with the popular stance among many philosophers that possible-worlds talk
in semantics is a convenient fiction or amere notational device, or that possible worlds
are “pleonastic entities” rather than real parts of our ontology.
 Truth Conditions as Positions in a Space
of Implications
Next, I want to introduce a different metasemantic view inspired by Sellars’s (,
) inferential-role account of semantic and mental content and developed in more
systematic detail in Brandom’s (, ) inferentialist version of pragmatism about
intentional content. I believe this is somewhat less familiar, so I’ll take a bit more
space to introduce it and bring it to bear on the metanormative issues introduced
above. The core idea is to reverse the normal order of explanation that moves from
a view about the semantic content of bits of language to a view about proprieties of
use in a social discursive practice. Instead, these inferentialists seek to explain why
sentences have the contents that they do in terms of what they are vehicles for doing
in a social discursive practice. However, not everything we can do with language is
relevant.18 When it comes to declarative sentences, these are conceived primarily as
vehicles for making assertions, which conception is then understood as undertaking
(acknowledging, or embracing) a particular kind of commitment.
More specifically, looking downstream from a sentence, various further sentences
would typically follow from its truth—e.g. part of the commitment carried by an
assertion of “Grass is green” is to grass’s being colored.19 Then, looking upstream
from a declarative sentence, it would typically follow from the truth of various other
sentences; and one who uses a declarative sentence to make an assertion is open
to a potential challenge to entitle oneself to this commitment by asserting one of
these other sentences—e.g. one who asserts “Stealing is wrong” might, if legitimately
18 This is, I believe, what distinguishes the view from Wittgenstein-inspired “use theories of meaning”
based on skepticism about drawing any principled line between the uses of language that reveal semantic
competence and those that reveal merely pragmatic understanding of the way language can be used to
achieve sundry goals. Brandom has recently characterized his linguistic pragmatism as the combination
of two principles. Methodological pragmatism: “the point of associating meanings, extensions, contents,
or other semantic interpretants with linguistic expressions is to codify proprieties of use,” and semantic
pragmatism: “all there is to effect the association of meanings, contents, extensions, rules or other semantic
interpretants with linguistic expressions is the way those expressions are used by the linguistic practitioners
themselves”(, pp. –). As long as we restrict the focus to the uses of language to make assertions,
which are distinguished in the way they license inference to other assertions and require defense via other
assertions, I think we get close to what most workaday semanticists take as their principal data: ordinary
speaker intuitions about the entailment, inconsistency, equivalence properties of sentences.
19 One may not always acknowledge the inferential consequences of what one asserts. So its being part
of what one is committed to is not the same as believing that it follows. But the more someone fails to
acknowledge what we take to follow from what one asserts, the less we will think she understands what she
is saying.
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challenged, have to back it up with reasons, for instance arguing that stealing involves
a gross violation of the respect we owe to each other as human beings.20
Importantly, these upstream and downstream inferential connections are not
merely logical entailments but rather in the broader family sometimes called semantic
implications, which are usually defeasible and context-sensitive.21 For this reason,
competence with the meaning of sentences can be thought of, on the inferentialist
picture, as coming in degrees. Howmuch one understands what one is saying depends
on how much one knows one’s way around a space of semantic implication-relations
containing the sentence and the types of things that would defeat these relations.22
Before we can bring this idea to bear on themetanormative issues introduced above,
there are two questions I want to address in order to flesh out the inferentialist idea.
First question: What does endorsing inferentialism mean for truth-conditional
semantics? Brandom sometimes writes as if inferentialism is inconsistent with appeal-
ing to truth conditions in one’s explanation of the semantic composition of declarative
sentences,23 but I doubt inferentialism and truth-conditional semantics are really
in tension, at least not when we understand “truth-conditional semantics” as the
approach in compositional semantics where one attempts to recursively derive some
specification of when a declarative sentence should be assigned the preferred semantic
value true relative to some parameters, thereby displaying the semantic function of the
sentence’s subsentential parts. Because of the pervasiveness of representationalism,
the representationalist gloss on the results of this approach is sometimes labelled
“truth-conditional semantics.” But I think it’s helpful to view representationalism
20 Often one may not actually be challenged to defend what one asserts, and, regarding certain kinds
of topics, one may be default entitled in most or all of the everyday situations where one would make an
assertion; but being the sort of linguistic move whose form makes it challengeable for reasons is essential
for being an assertion. (Brandom , pp. –)
21 We can then seek to recover specifically “logical” entailments by restricting ourselves to consideration
of the semantic implications ensured by the “logical” form and words of the sentence.
22 Sellars and Brandom tend to take a very expansive view of the implication-relations that are relevant
to the determination of meaning. However, any plausible version of their views would embrace the idea
that how central such a relation is to determining the meaning of a particular word/concept is something
that comes in degrees, and the lesson we were supposed to have learned from Quine’s attack of the
analytic/synthetic divide is that it is not possible, in general, to draw a sharp line between the implications
that hold in virtue of meaning alone and the implications that hold in virtue of something else (though if
we hold enough other stuff fixed, we might be able to draw a practically useful line in particular contexts).
23 For example, he writes, “. . . truth is not a concept that has an important explanatory role to play in
philosophy. Appearances to the contrary, are the result of misunderstanding its distinctive expressive role.
The word ‘true’ does indeed let us say things that in many cases we could not say without it. But when we
understandwhat it lets us say, and how it does that, we will see that the very features that make it expressively
useful make it completely unsuitable to do the sort of theoretical explanatory work for which philosophers
have typically enlisted its aid.” (, pp. –) Later, however, he strikes a slightly more conciliatory tone,
“What about the role of truth in semantic explanation, via a definition of propositional content in terms
of truth conditions? We certainly do use ‘true’ to say what the content of a claim is. . . . But it would be a
mistake to infer from this sort of appeal to truth conditions to express propositional contents that one can
explain what propositional contents are by appeal to the conditions under which sentences are true.” (ibid.,
p. )
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and inferentialism as a metasemantic interpretation of the results of first-order com-
positional semantics (whatever these happen to be). More specifically, I think an
inferentialist should view the specification of the truth conditions of a sentence as an
initial spelling out of what one who asserts the sentence is committed to as a premise
with further downstream inferential consequences, andwhat onewould have to entitle
oneself to by looking to upstream inferential antecedents were one to be legitimately
challenged. In this way, we might say that an assignment of truth conditions to a
sentence is an articulation of the position in a network of implications occupied by
one who uses the sentence to make an assertion in ordinary discursive practice.24
In cases such as () and (), this may appear trivial. Of course, one who asserts
that grass is green has undertaken a commitment describable as a commitment to
the proposition that grass is green; and one who asserts that stealing is wrong has
undertaken a commitment describable as a commitment to the proposition that
stealing is wrong. But when it comes to more complex cases where it is not entirely
clear what truth conditions to assign to a sentence, this way of thinking of things lets
us interpret candidate assignments as articulations of different positions in a network
of implications. For example, if someone asserts
() Visiting relatives can be boring,
is she committed to the proposition that those relatives who visit are boring, or is she
committed to the proposition that going to visit relatives is boring? Disambiguating
this sentence by assigning truth conditions in line with one or the other of these
interpretations has implications for what further commitments downstream from an
assertion of this sentence would carry and what further assertions one would have to
make upstream from this assertion in order to entitle oneself to it if legitimately chal-
lenged. In this way, assigning truth conditions can be viewed as an attempt to identify
what inferential commitments are implicitly endorsed, embraced, or acknowledged by
someone who uses the sentence to make an assertion. Rather than being—in the first
instance—commitments to reality’s being a particular way, they are commitments that
carry downstream inferential consequences and that must, in principle, be defensible
via upstream inferential antecedents.
Of course, representationalists will typically agree that declarative sentences have
upstream and downstream inferential connections to other sentences that are some-
how relevant to understanding semantic content. What distinguishes inferentialism is
that it appeals directly to the spectrum of these connections (rather than to anything
about representing reality) in its metasemantic account of what it is in virtue of which
sentences have the truth conditions that they do.
Second question: If declarative sentences are understood first and foremost as vehicles
for undertaking inferentially articulable commitments, what does this mean for the
24 Compare Williams (, pp. –; ), who also argues that inferentialism is compatible with a
truth-conditionalist approach to compositional semantics.
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intuitive thought that many declarative sentences describe the way things are in the
world around us? Many philosophers seem to think that inferentialism undermines
the very idea of a sentence’s describing reality. The thought is something like this: if
semantic contents are positions in something we characterize as merely a “game” of
giving and asking for reasons rather than specifications of how reality has to be in
order for the relevant sentence to be true, then surely no sentences should be viewed as
describing reality. Alternatively, inferentialism is sometimes portrayed as taking what
is usually a local denial that some area of discourse is representational (e.g. normative
or modal) and generalizing it to all areas of discourse. Here, the thought is something
like this: If everythingwe say is somehowabout howwe should infer, and you think this
“should” is prescriptive rather than descriptive, then surely thatmeans that nothingwe
say is a description of how things are in the world around us.25
While granting that some things some inferentialists have written may suggest
that this is the view,26 I think a wholesale rejection of the idea that some declarative
sentences describe the world around us is an extreme version of the view not actually
endorsed by some of its central proponents. For example, Sellars was famously an
inferentialist about content and a realist about science, writing “in the dimension of
describing and explaining the world, science is the measure of all things, of what is
that it is, and of what is not that it is not” (, §). And Brandom characterizes
his inferentialism as supported by a “sophisticated expressivism” about logical, modal,
and normative vocabulary that “. . . is essentially, and not just accidentally, a local
expressivism.” This is because, in the way he understands the expressive role of
these vocabularies, it depends on the existence of other vocabularies that play a
descriptive role: “Autonomous discursive practicesmust contain vocabularies playing
other expressive roles—for instance, observational vocabulary that reports features of
the non-linguistic bits of the world” (, p. ). In the context of the arguments
here, this is good because any view that implies that ought-sentences aren’t descriptive
because no declarative sentence is descriptive could achieve only a pyrrhic victory.
25 For example, Price imagines what a quasirealist expressivist like Blackburn might say if he adopted a
Brandomian inferentialist conception of assertion. Price suggests the expressivist might say, “I used to think
ofmyHumean expressivism as a local position, applicable to some vocabularies but not others. . . .However,
I have now come to realise that for no vocabulary at all is it theoretically interesting to say that its function
is to ‘represent’ particular kinds of states of affairs. . . .This. . .does nothing to undermine the interesting
observations that got me started, about the distinctive—and different—functions of moral and modal
vocabulary. On the contrary, it simply implies that they are exemplars of an approach to language we should
be employing everywhere. In other words, what I took to be linguistic islands are simply the most visible
extremities of an entire new continent—a universal program for theorising about language in expressivist
rather than representationalist terms . . .” (, pp. –).
26 Macarthur and Price () appear very sympathetic to this idea. But, in later work, Price (,
chapter ) has developed a more nuanced position, which trades on a distinction between thoughts that
carry information (what he terms i-representations) and a species of these which empirically track themind-
independent world (what he terms e-representations). See also Blackburn () and Williams () for
useful discussion and repudiation of global expressivism in the sense at issue here.
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So, in my view, inferentialism is not committed to global expressivism or the idea
that language use is merely a “game” of giving and asking for reasons, rather than a
central part of how humans conceptualize the world and reason about what to do in
it. To the contrary, I think someone sympathetic with inferentialism might argue that
some or evenmany sentences have direct inferential consequences for our views about
the way reality is. Knowing how to draw the line between those that are and those that
aren’t is difficult, but maybe “Grass is green.” is such a sentence, in which case, one
who asserts it might be thought to be inferentially committed to the proposition that
grass has the (real, mind-independent, describable) property of being green. That is
to suggest that one of the direct downstream inferential connections of this sentence
is to another sentence deploying explicitly representational notions. Maybe we think
this is the best way to make sense of the idea that the use of such sentences is causally
regulated by tightly corresponding features of the world, such as the color of grass,
and that such use is plausibly treated on a tracking model of the relation between
language use and extralinguistic reality.27 If this were right about this sentence or any
other class of sentences, inferentialism might be seen as overlapping with the core
representationalist idea outlined above but as also offering a deeper explanation of the
relevant phenomena.
Of course, if we maintained that all declarative sentences had such direct infer-
ential consequences for our views about the way reality is, then we would have a
metasemantic view that was supposed to be an alternative to representationalism but
which turned out to be a sophisticated version of it.28 As we’ll see below, the textbook
expressivist move in this context is to insist on a distinction between mental states
with descriptive and directive roles in the psychology of motivation (“belief-like” and
“desire-like” attitudes as they are often called, with different “directions of fit”) and
argue that normative claims express mental states with a desire-like direction of fit
with the world. Whether or not this is consistent with truth-conditional approaches
to compositional semantics, especially as applied to ‘ought,’ is a complicated and
27 Williams (, pp. –) explores a more sophisticated way to cash out this distinction in terms of
various clauses in an explanation of meaning in terms of use. As Williams argues, some such explanations
may be ontologically conservative in that they do not mention referents (properties when it comes to
predicates) of the terms whose use they are appealing to in explaining meaning, but others won’t be. My
suggestion here (following Williams) is that the explanations of the meaning of color vocabulary in terms
of its use might not be ontologically conservative, while the explanation of deontic modal vocabulary is a
plausible candidate for an explanation that can be ontologically conservative.
28 Drawing on Peacocke (; ) and Block (), Wedgwood (, , chapter ) articulates a
theory of conceptual roles as determining the representational function of the words that express concepts
with these roles. On this view, each word refers to something, and what it refers to is determined in part
by the conceptual role of the concept it expresses; and it is the logical composition of these concepts that
determines how each declarative sentence represents reality as being. Because he uses a truth-conditional
semantic rule similar to the modal rule stated above, he ends up defending a conceptual-role interpretation
of this rule that bears important similarities to the one I develop below. However, because he treats all
words as referring to something in reality, his inferentialism makes no room for distinguishing between
representational and nonrepresentational vocabulary. By contrast, I see in the inferentialist metasemantics
resources for motivating a distinction at least when it comes to ‘ought.’
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controversial matter that I’ll touch on below. But as I understand inferentialism, at
least of the sort developed by Sellars and Brandom, it offers a different set of resources
for marking out ought-claims from those we typically think of as representing reality.
In short, this is to classify ‘ought’ with othermodal terms and then to treatmodal terms
along the lines of sentential logical operators. Typically, inferentialists explain why
logical operators have the content they do, not in terms ofwhat in reality they represent
but instead in terms of something they allow us to do: state and endorse/reject claims
about the inferential commitments carried by the use of other sorts of terms. How
exactly does this work for ‘ought’?
 Application to Necessity Modals Including ‘Ought’
There is another idea championed by Sellars and Brandom that I think is not consti-
tutive of an inferentialist metasemantics but a natural extension of it.The idea is that
some terms do not earn their keep from the way they let us represent pieces of reality
but rather by serving as what we might call metaconceptual devices for embracing
commitment to features of the conceptual (inferential) framework in which ordinary
representational terms have determinate application. Sellars (, ) defended
an explicitly metalinguistic and inferentialist version of this claim, arguing that in
addition to descriptive words applying to empirically knowable pieces of reality, our
language contains “categorical” words whose core function is not to describe reality
but to embrace commitment to the inferential relations which must hold between
descriptive words for them to count as descriptive in the first place. In this way,
Sellars viewed philosophically puzzling words as many philosophers view logical
words: not as adding to the descriptive content of the sentences in which they figure
but rather as devices for affirming commitment (at least implicitly) to the inferential
connections between otherwords (oftenwordswhich do add to the descriptive content
of the sentences in which they figure). On Sellars’s way of working out this line
of thought, implicit commitment to these kinds of inferential connections is seen
as a crucial element of ordinary competence with other descriptive words; and the
metaconceptual words provide, as Brandom puts it, means for making explicit those
implicit commitments.
There may be other philosophically interesting words that are metaconceptual
rather than representational in this sense.29 However, I think one of the most per-
suasive uses of this idea is for conceptual necessity claims. For example, consider:
() Necessarily, if x is east of y, then y is west of x.
29 Kant (, A/B), for example, identified twelve “pure concepts of the understanding” interpret-
ing them in something like this way. In a similar vein, Sellars () argued that terms such as “substance”
and “quality” are metalinguistic devices that get their content from the way they can be used to endorse the
types of inferential connections between other empirical terms, connections whichmust be in place, at least
implicitly, for these terms to count as applying to empirically knowable pieces of reality in the first place.
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Sellars and Brandom would say that this sentence does not represent a piece of reality
involving the modal relation between locations which are situated east/west of each
other. Rather it is a device for acknowledging the conceptual validity of inferences of
the form
x is east of y→ y is west of x
thereby (partially) spelling out and explicitly committing to the inferential connec-
tions between more basic terms such as ‘east’ and ‘west.’30
Does this mean that, according to Sellars and Brandom, conceptual necessity
claims such as () are mere “inference tickets” in a “game” of giving and asking for
reasons, rather than sentences with truth-conditional content? I think it would be
foolish to make that claim.31 Instances of () can clearly be embedded in “It is true
that . . .” and other truth-functional contexts, and they express something that can
be doubted, believed, known, etc. So, it would be very strange to say that they do
not have truth-conditional content. Indeed, something akin to the standard possible-
worlds semantics for alethicmodality provides a pretty good articulation of these truth
conditions.
Assuming this is (roughly) right, the crucial metasemantic question is what it is in
virtue of which this truth-conditional specification of the content of some instance of
() is correct (insofar as it is)? As we have already seen, the representationalist answer
is that it is correct in virtue of correctly identifying how that instance of () represents
reality as being. By contrast, an inferentialist following Sellars and Brandom would
say these truth conditions are correct in virtue of correctly modeling the position in
space of implications taken up by someone who asserts that instance of () in normal
discursive practice. One who accepts this sentence is committed to y‘s being to the
west of x, if she is committed to x’s being to the east of y. In most contexts, were it to
come up, in order to entitle oneself to an instance of (), onemight need only to affirm
one’s competence with the words ‘east’ and ‘west.’32
30 Compare Thomasson (, ) who argues that this is the appropriate account of metaphysical
necessity claims. Here my suggestion on behalf of Sellars and Brandom is the weaker idea that at least one
species of necessity claim plays this inference-rule endorsing role. If Thomasson is right, however, that’s a
congenial conclusion.
31 Kant and Frege sometimes seem to be making something like this claim, e.g. “. . . the modality of
judgments is a very special function thereof, which has the distinguishing feature that it does not contribute
to the content of the judgment” (Kant, , A/B), and “By saying that a proposition is necessary I
give a hint about the grounds for my judgment. But, since this does not affect the conceptual content of the
judgment, the form of the apodictic judgment has no significance for us” (Frege, , p. ). However it is
probably anachronistic to view them as speaking of the compositional semantic content of modal sentences
rather than something like the empirical or descriptive content of the thoughts expressed by canonical uses
of these sentences.
32 What about conceptual necessity claims whose prejacents are not explicitly conditional in form? As
with all modal claims, we’d still articulate their truth conditions relative to background conditions in the
context of use, and these truth conditions could be viewed as depicting the idea that one who takes those
background conditions to hold is committed to the truth of the explicit prejacent.
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This is how I see an inferentialist metasemantics, when combined with the further
Sellarsian/Brandomian idea that some terms are metaconceptual devices, as provid-
ing resources for interpreting the truth conditions of some sentences along non-
representationalist lines. So, now we should turn back to the main topic of this paper:
‘ought.’
Above I claimed that the standard treatment of this word in compositional seman-
tics is as a necessity modal rather than an ordinary predicate-forming term. That
already suggests interpreting the truth-conditional contribution of ‘ought’ in terms
of its being a metaconceptual device. The main objection to this basic idea, I think,
is that the standard possible-worlds semantics for necessity modals faces difficulty
in making sense of the distinctive prescriptive uses of ‘ought’ common in normative
discourse.That is why I favor the enhancement of the standard account sketched in §.
This continues to treat ‘ought’s truth-conditional contribution in terms of a universal
quantification over possibilia, but it refines the kinds of prejacent content ‘ought’ is
thought to embed, and it makes correlative enhancements to the conception of the
possibilia at which these prejacents are to be evaluated.
I think this can now be leveraged into a very plausible inferentialist treatment of
‘ought’ as a metaconceptual device, which then opens up space for distinguishing all
ought-claims from descriptive claims.The core idea is to interpret ‘ought’ as getting its
content from its role in embracing commitment to inferential connections between
more basic items, rather than from its representational purport. This is analogous to
themetasemantic story about conceptual necessities provided by Sellars andBrandom.
Thenwe deploy the enhancedmodal rule frombefore to generate specific explanations
of the types of more basic claims whose inferential connections are embraced via an
ought-claim.
For instance,
() We ought to do more to relieve great suffering.
would be said to have truth conditions something like the following:
[[()]]fg = T iff [[Let’s do more to relieve to relieve great suffering!]] = L in all
<w, n> ∈ Pfg
where this is conceived as a modal operation on a prescription, evaluating its legiti-
macy across a contextually determined set Pfg of world-norm pairs.
However, inferentialists won’t gloss this as an articulation of how () represents
modal reality as being (e.g. as containing various possible worlds and possible norms,
according to which the relevant prescription is legitimate). Rather they could inter-
pret the truth-conditional specification of the content of () as a depiction of a
point in a network of inferentially specifiable commitments one takes on when one
endorses (). Downstream, one is committed to prescriptions to act (in particular
contexts) inways that complywith the prejacent prescription; and upstreamonemight
defend () by appealing to more general normative claims that support the norms
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relative to which the prescriptional content is legitimate at the contextually relevant
worlds.
Although inspired by Brandom, it is worth noting that my proposal here is con-
siderably more conservative than his suggestion (in Brandom, , chapter ) that
all normative and evaluative terms should be understood as metaconceptual devices
governing specifically practical inferences. He considers such sentences as:
() You’re obliged, if you’re a bank employee, to wear a necktie to work.
() It is wrong, if it’s done to no purpose, to harm someone.
and claims a sentence like these “. . .makes explicit the endorsement . . . of material
proprieties of practical reasoning” (, p. ). His idea is that, just as conceptual
necessity claims such as () could be seen as devices for embracing inferential
connections between the applications ofmore basic concepts such as “east” and “west,”
sentences such as () and () should be seen as devices for embracing inferential
connections between more basic concepts such as “bank employee” and “harm to no
purpose” and practical thoughts about what to do, e.g. in the inferences:
I am a bank employee→ so I shall wear a necktie to work
Repeating the gossip would harm someone to no purpose→ I shall not repeat the
gossip
where these are conceived as “language-exit” transitions because the termini are the
expressions of intentions that—when the time comes, assuming things go normally—
will result in the agent’s doing something other than making further linguistic moves.
Leaving aside what to say about other normative terms, this surely cannot be the
right metasemantic story about why ‘ought’ makes the semantic contribution that it
does. For, as we saw above, not all ought-sentences are about what someone is to do.
For instance,
() Larry, who has had themost unfortunate time of things recently, ought to win
the lottery.
does not seem to prescribe an action to Larry (or anyone else). So, although such sen-
tencesmay be “normative” or “evaluative” in some broader sense, they are not plausibly
construed as endorsing patterns of narrowly practical inference, i.e. inferences that end
with a language-exit expressible with an “I shall . . . ”.
Nevertheless, I think we can and should make sense of these sentences as non-
descriptive. If we use my enhanced modal rule for ‘ought’ and think of it as taking
propositional rather than prescriptional prejacents for these sentences, then (simpli-
fying slightly) we will get truth conditions for these sentences that say that they are
true just in case some proposition is true at all of some contextually determined set of
possible worlds. When it next comes to a metasemantic interpretation of this result,
we could view the relevant specifications of truth conditions as an initial spelling out
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of a position in a space of implications, which determines an inference rule; and these
sentences could then be seen as devices for embracing (acknowledging, endorsing)
this rule. For example, () might be thought of as a device for embracing (andmaking
explicit one’s commitment to) the defeasible semantic validity of inferences of the
form:
Larry has had the most unfortunate time of things recently→ Larry’s winning the
lottery would be most preferable (compared to the salient alternatives).
where the conclusion of this inference isn’t itself a language-exit but a commitment to
a certain constraint on one’s preferences.
That’s admittedly a very rough idea. The purpose of mentioning it here is just
to indicate that full consideration of the types of sentences in which ‘ought’ figures
suggests that it cannot be solely a device for endorsing inferential connections between
propositional commitments and narrowly practical commitments in the way that
Brandom suggests. That does not mean, however, that he’s wrong about its being
a metaconceptual device for endorsing inferential connections more generally, on
the model of conceptual necessity. This is precisely how I think an inferentialist
should interpret the enhanced modal rule for ‘ought’ spelled out above, which always
involves determining the truth conditions of an ought-sentence in terms of a universal
quantification over possibilia. This allows for an evaluation of the legitimacy of an
embedded prescription across a range of norms as a special case but also the truth of
an embedded proposition across a range of worlds as another special case.
Recall the apparent tension between the ideas that (i) ‘ought’s do not describe
what is actually the case but prescribe possible action, thought, and feeling, and
(ii) all declarative sentences deserve the same general semantic treatment, e.g. in
terms of compositionally specified truth conditions. In §, I argued that there’s a
representationalist resolution of this tension, which treats all declarative sentences
as having the truth conditions that they have in virtue of their representing a way
reality could be, but which also allows that ought-sentences don’t describe what is
actually the case because, as their truth conditions suggest, they represent how things
stand with respect to possible worlds and norms. In this section, I have developed
an alternative resolution of this tension.The inferentialist metasemantics says that all
declarative sentences have the truth conditions that they have in virtue of the position
in a space of implications that accepting the sentence commits one to, but it also
allows us to draw a distinction between sentences playing a first-order descriptive
role and those playing a higher-order metaconceptual role. It’s not obvious where to
draw the line between these, but empirical claims we think of as tracking features of
our perceptual environment are a pretty good candidate for the former, and claims
containing logical terms we think of as providing the conceptual scaffolding within
which complex logical interrelations can be specified are a pretty good candidate for
the latter.The truth-conditionalist semantic rule for ‘ought’ encourages us to think of
it along the lines of a necessity modal, and I have suggested that this means we should
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think of it as a metaconceptual device rather than a term for representing pieces of
reality.
This carries an ontological benefit over the representationalist way of resolving the
tension between (i) and (ii): we don’t have to commit ourselves to the reality of possible
worlds and possible norms in order to recognize some ought-claims as true. But, for
this, it incurs the cost of explaining inmore detail why language should have terms that
function asmetaconceptual devices and how to tell the difference between those terms
and representational terms. Although I am not going to pay it here, it’s a debt I view as
worth paying. (However, I also admit to difficulty in knowing how to think about the
exchange rate between such high-level theoretical costs and benefits.) In any case, my
main claim is that the deciding factor between representationalism and inferentialism
should not be which of ideas (i) and (ii) we are more impressed by but rather what we
think of the relative merits of how these two views respect these ideas.
 Comparison to Expressivism
I want to conclude by discussing a more familiar constellation of ideas that might also
be thought to provide an alternative to representationalist treatments of normative
sentences.This is born out of the noncognitivist thesis that normative claims express
conative attitudes rather representations of reality, the sorts of attitudes that are
supposed to class with desires rather than beliefs in their motivational potentials (or
“directions of fit”) in a Humean psychology of motivation.This noncognitivist thesis
has received considerable attention and refinement over the past half century, resulting
in a number of different positions now defended under the banner of “expressivism.”
Moreover, expressivism has been applied in several domains besides normative dis-
course (modal, epistemic, aesthetic, alethic, etc.) with importantly differing theoretical
constraints. So, I find it far from clear what the core of expressivism is and how it
relates to the inferentialist ideas explored above. As we already saw, some think of
inferentialism as a kind of “global expressivism”—but that’s not the view one finds
in Sellars and Brandom. Moreover, many philosophers conceive of expressivism as
premised on rejecting truth-conditionalist semantics in favor of a “psychologistic”
alternative,33 at least in its application to normative discourse—but that’s not how
I think we should think of inferentialism.
I’m not going to be able to discuss all possible (or even many) versions of expres-
sivism here.34 But I think it will prove useful to discuss one expressivist line of thought
about ‘ought’ that I think comes closest to the inferentialist line of thought developed
above.This will put me in a position to explain how some ways of developing the view
might result in an alternative to inferentialism that has various problems while others
33 This is, for instance, the way expressivism is conceived by critics such as Rosen (, pp. –),
Wedgwood (, p. ), Kalderon (, pp. –), and Schroeder (, p. ).
34 See Chrisman () for my take on some historical and contemporary versions of expressivism.
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might result in friendly amendments to inferentialism. Hopefully, this will also clarify
the inferentialist view outlined above.
As long as we continue to observe the distinction between semantics and metase-
mantics, I think it should be clear that expressivism needn’t be understood as a view
about compositional semantics.35 We can find a version of expressivism as part of a
largermetasemantic view that has, until now in this paper, remained conspicuously off
stage.This is the view that the truth conditions assigned by compositional semantics
are articulations of what one who asserts one of these sentences ought to think. For
instance, in the most basic case, it’s plausible to say that one who asserts
() Grass is green.
ought to think (judge, affirm) that grass is green.The idea is that someone who asserts
this sentence but does not think this thought has violated the semantic rule associated
with () in virtue of its core communicative role. So, rather than starting with the
view that truth conditions articulate the way reality must be in order for a sentence
to be true, an “ideationalist” metasemantics would encourage us to start with the
view that semantic assignments to sentences tell us what idea one ought to have when
one uses the sentence canonically, in order to conform with the core communicative
norms associated with the sentence in the language.36 This is one plausible way to
flesh out the vague and popular suggestion that different sentences are canonical and
conventionalmeans for expressing differentmental states.37 Then, on this ideationalist
view, the truth-conditionalist articulation of the subsentential elements of language
could be viewed as an explanation of how an indefinite number of such expressive
commitments are generated by a finite number of terms and logical forms.
Although ideationalism starts in a different place from representationalism, it’s
wholly compatible with the representationalist view that sentences such as () rep-
resent reality. For an ideationalist can say that the truth conditions of () specify
the way this sentence represents reality as being by virtue of articulating the content
of a particular kind of thought, a representational thought about the way reality is,
35 Compare Suikkanen (), Chrisman (b), Yalcin (), Silk (), Charlow (a, p. ),
and Ridge (, chapter ).
36 Precursors and versions of this idea can be found in Grice (), Blackburn (), Davis ().
Although defending a somewhat similar idea, I think Richard () would say that it’s wrong to think of
these as truth conditions but that compositional semantic values can be interpreted as modeling a space of
commitments to various thoughts.
37 See Schroeder (, chapter ) and Ridge (, §.) for further discussion of the expression
relation appropriate for developing a form of metanormative expressivism. Both end up developing forms
of expressivism with an account of expression very similar to the account I am using here. The key
commonality is in construing the relation as a hypothetical linguistic norm, something like: if one uses
the sentence to make an assertion, one ought to think the relevant thought in order to conform with the
core communicative rules of the language. In Bar-On and Chrisman (), we argue that distinguishing
the way in which users of a sentence express mental states from the way in which sentence-types express
their semantic contents provides for a much simpler and more plausible explanation of the apparently
distinctive connection between moral claims and motivational attitudes than is on offer in standard forms
of metaethical expressivism.
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which one who asserts the sentence ought to have in order to conform with the core
communicative rules of the language.
Then, a “metasemantic” form of expressivism begins to come into view when
we observe that, although the ideationalist can agree with the representationalist
about sentences like (), she needn’t agree that all declarative sentences represent
reality. For she can argue that some sentences are conventional means for expressing
nonrepresentational thoughts, the content of which is specified by the truth conditions
the correct semantic theory assigns to the sentence.38 For example, an expressivist
might argue that one who uses a sentence such as:
() Stealing is wrong.
to make an assertion ought to think a particular thought, i.e. that stealing is wrong.
Then, however, she will argue that the functional role of this thought in the psychology
of motivation is directive of action rather than representative of reality.
This move obviously requires giving up on the idea that truth is something like
correct representation, which is why most contemporary expressivists embrace some
sort of minimalism about truth (though I think some kind of pluralism about truth
would also serve this purpose).
But that raises an important question: how could the expression of a directive
thought be something that one could doubt or know to be true, even in a defla-
tionary sense? After all, paradigmatic directive mental states are desires, preferences,
and plans, and these are not the proper objects of doubt and knowledge. In the
present context, I think expressivists might insist that the characterization of directive
thoughts as “desire-like” rather than “belief-like” is simply misleading and distracting.
The important claim is that some thoughts are thoughts about reality, they represent
reality as being a particular way; other thoughts are about what to do, they direct us to
make reality become a particular way.The standard Humean view of the psychology
motivation is that action always results from the cooperation of these two kinds of
thoughts. We should allow expressivists to call both “beliefs” in many core cases; the
important suggestion is that one of them has a directive rather than descriptive func-
tional role in the psychology of human motivation. It is because of the way in which
this role stands in contrast with the descriptive functional role of other thoughts that
this kind of expressivism promises to carry whatever attractions were in earlier views
38 For similar ideas, compare Blackburn (, pp. –), Silk (, p. ), Ridge (, chapter ), Perez
Carballo (). Charlow (forthcoming) develops a metasemantic form of expressivism in the context of a
dynamic “test” semantics for deontic and epistemic modals.This is importantly different in its rejection of
the semantic explanations of truth-conditional semantics, but it still shares in conceiving of expressivism
as a metasemantic thesis. Yalcin (, p. ) characterizes his expressivism as a pragmatic rather than a
semantic thesis. However, if that interpretation is going to carry the ontological benefits expressivism is
supposed to carry, then I think the pragmatics needs to be part of a broader metasemantic theory—perhaps
one that explains why sentences have the truth conditions they do in terms of what conversational moves
they are canonical means for making. I believe this is consonant with the characterization of metasemantics
in Yalcin ().
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in the expressivist tradition. Moreover, if one can make sense of evaluating directive
thoughts as beingmore and less reasonable, justified, or warranted, a proponent of this
view would be on the way to making sense of the way that normative beliefs seem to
be the objects of epistemic evaluations.39
So, at least oneway to conceive ofmetanormative expressivism is as the combination
of theHumean psychology ofmotivationwith an ideationalist metasemantic interpre-
tation of the truth conditions of normative sentences.More specifically, wewill need to
think of the truth conditions of normative sentences such as () as the articulation of
directive rather than descriptive thoughts. We can give them truth conditions such as
[[()]] = T iff stealing is wrong
and think of this as an articulation of what one who asserts this sentence ought
to think, in order to conform to the core communicative rules associated with this
sentence. However, in their philosophy of mind, expressivists will argue that this
thought plays a directive rather than a descriptive role in the psychology of moti-
vation. By understanding expressivism as part of an overall metasemantic package,
rather than a controversial thesis in compositional semantics, we could then grant
expressivists access to all of the successes of standard truth-conditional approaches to
compositional semantics, while leaving room in the philosophy of mind for them to
make theHumean argument that normative thoughts are nondescriptive because they
are directive.
There is a lot more we might want to know about metasemantic forms of expres-
sivism, but the crucial question for me at this stage is whether this generates a
competitor to the inferentialist metasemantic view about ‘ought’ outlined above or a
possible partner for it in a coalition against representationalism about ‘ought.’ I think
that’s going to depend on what expressivists say about several further questions.
FirstQuestion:What sort of thoughts dometasemantic expressivists say are expressed
by logically complex sentences?Those versed in debate about the Frege-Geach prob-
lemmight grant that cleaving to a truth-conditionalist semantics and now attempting
to develop expressivism in one’s metasemantics provides for a better answer to this
question than old-school versions of expressivism did. For the expressivist can now
begin by saying that a sentence such as
() Either stealing is common or stealing is wrong.
has the truth conditions of a disjunction, i.e. a logical form ensuring that it is true
if either of its disjuncts is true. Still, if our metasemantic expressivist says that it
39 Though we will have to reject Cuneo’s suggestion that it is platitudinous that “. . . propositional
attitudes display one or another epistemic merit (or positive epistemic status) such as being a case of
knowledge, being warranted, being an instance of understanding, insight or wisdom and the like, only
insofar as they are representative in some respect.” (, p. ) See Chrisman (, , c) for
discussion of the prospects of nonrepresentational attitudes’ achieving positive epistemic status.
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has these truth conditions in virtue of expressing the disjunctive thought that either
stealing is common or stealing is wrong, we can ask: what kind of thought is that? In the
simple Humean psychology of motivation we were working with above, there are only
descriptive and directive thoughts. Andwhile wemaywant to say that this thought has
descriptive and directive elements, the expressivist metasemantics seems to require
us to be able to say what kind of mental state the whole thought represents. After
all, as I glossed it above, the expressivist’s way of securing the claim that normative
sentences don’t describe reality is by claiming that these sentences express directive
thought rather than descriptive thought.
In response, expressivists might try to argue that logically complex sentences such
as () are directive, but in an attenuated sense. The idea would be to treat them as
the expression of conditional dispositions to infer, where inferring is conceived as a
mental action. So, in this case, we might think of () as expressing a thought about
what to do: if I come to reject one of the disjuncts I shall embrace the other.40
As someone sympathetic with inferentialism, naturally I think there’s something
importantly right about understanding the meaning of logically complex sentences in
terms of their inferential interrelations with other sentences. However, I doubt using
this attenuated sense of “directive” is going to let us draw the line between represen-
tational and nonrepresentational thoughts anywhere near where we want to draw it
for the purposes of metanormative theory. For notice that even a paradigmatically
descriptive sentence such as ()might be thought to direct inference (e.g. if you accept
this, do not infer any conclusion that entails that grass is not green!). Moreover, it
would be highly odd to place
() Grass is green or roses are red.
() Grass is green and roses are red.
on the directive side of the ledger, given that we place each of the atomic parts on the
descriptive side of the ledger.41
Because of this, the answer I think expressivists should give to the first question
is that the Humean psychology of motivation is too stark; there are more than just
descriptive and directive thoughts, and the thoughts expressed by logically complex
sentences are neither purely descriptive nor purely directive. But, if expressivists gives
that answer, then they oweus a new account ofwhat distinguishes the class of sentences
that have their truth conditions in virtue of expressing a representational thought and
40 This is one way to make sense of Blackburn’s (, pp. –; ) suggestion that logically complex
thoughts “tie one to a tree.”
41 I think a similar problem arises for Ridge’s (, , ) suggestion that logically complex
sentences express hybrid states. The idea is that sentences such as () express beliefs with a descriptive
content that is logically isomorphic to the normative sentence but they also express interlocking directive
attitude (e.g. the endorsement of an ideal adviser or a normative perspective).The problem I see for this idea
is that it ends up committing one to treating all logically complex sentences as expressive of a (partially)
desire-like state of mind, or else it involves an ad hoc treatment of the role of logical particles in various
logically complex sentences.
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all of the other sentences that supposedly express nonrepresentational thoughts. If
being directive isn’t necessary for a thought to be nonrepresentational, what is?
I don’t think it’s obvious how expressivists should answer this question, but one way
to look for an answer is to think about the downstream inferential consequences of
the thoughts in question. For example, expressivists might insist that the thought that
grass is green directly implies something about how reality is (i.e. without the aid of
substantive auxiliary premises) but the thought that stealing is wrong does not directly
imply something about how reality is. If that’s right, there might be diverse reasons
why some thoughts do not directly imply something about how reality is, but it would
be the absence of this downstream inferential connection that marked out the class
of nonrepresentational thoughts. Obviously, if expressivists go in this direction, their
position begins to look like a coalition partner for rather than a competitor with the
inferentialist view sketched above.
Second Question: What do metasemantic expressivists say about ‘ought’? By asking
this question, I don’t mean to reopen the issue of whether amodal analysis of the truth
conditions of ought-sentences is right (say, in comparisonwith attempts to reductively
analyze ‘ought’ in terms of values or reasons). Indeed, since the sort of expressivists I
have in mind are now on board with truth-conditional semantics, I shall assume they
accept something like the enhanced modal rule outlined above. But what do they say
it is in virtue of which the truth conditions predicted by this rule are (approximately)
correct?
The initial response is clear: it’s in virtue of the fact that ought-sentences are
conventional and canonicalmeans for expressing ought-thoughts. But what are ought-
thoughts, descriptive or directive or do they fall in some yet-to-be-specified third
category? Again, if we work with the stark Humean division between descriptive
and directive thoughts, it may seem as if expressivists are going to say that ought-
thoughts are uniformly directive. However, when we consider the data, that doesn’t
seem plausible. At least it seems pretty implausible to say that all ought-sentences have
the truth conditions that they do in virtue of expressing a thought whose primary
functional role is to provide the goal-setting rather than means-providing element in
a Humean explanation of action. Consider:
() I ought to have begun my higher education at a different college.
() NATO ought not to expand any further.
I won’t ever be in a position to begin my higher education again; I won’t ever be in
the position of NATO; so why think that the thoughts I would express by asserting
these sentences have the motivational efficacy characteristic of directional thoughts
in a Humean explanation of action? To be sure, an expressivist might insist that these
sentences express something like plans or preferences conditioned on being in exactly
the situation of my former self or of NATO. But that looks like a patch: something
expressivists have to say rather than an intuitive gloss of the core communicative
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function of sentences. So, this is a cost for the overall plausibility of the theory.
Moreover, as we have already observed, there are non-agentive but at least weakly
normative ought-claims, such as the teleological and evaluative ought-sentences ()–
() from above. Whatever connection there is between having the thought expressed
by these sentences and being motivated to perform some specific act is going to
be rather indirect and highly defeasible. We are right, I think, to question whether
someone understands what she is saying if she says something of the form “All things
considered, I ought to φ,” and yet has no motivation to φ. However, it is much
less plausible to think that competence with ‘ought’ more generally—even in many
paradigmatic normative uses—requires any particular motivational propensities.
This is why I think expressivists should instead answer the question by arguing that
many ought-thoughts fit into some third category of thoughts, neither purely descrip-
tive nor purely directive.42 Again, however, we should ask: what are they like and
what about themmakes themnonrepresentational?And again I think the inferentialist
story sketched above might provide some helpful resources for expressivists. That is
to say that expressivists could treat some thoughts (paradigmatically ones expressed
with necessity modals) as not themselves representational but rather ways of encoding
metaconceptual manipulations on more basic pieces of semantic content, resulting in
thoughts explicating the structure of a space of inferential relations. Maybe there are
other way expressivists could answer this question,43 but obviously if they answer it
this way, the view is again a plausible partner to rather than a competitor with the
inferentialist view sketched above.
Third Question: If semantic content of sentences is to be explained in terms of the
content of the mental states (or “thoughts”) they express, as expressivists maintain,
then what explains the content of these mental states?The ideationalist conception of
truth conditions sketched above takes for granted mental content in order to explain
semantic content, which means that anyone endorsing it owes a further account of
mental content.
42 Although Blackburn (, ) is deeply influenced by Hume, he finds in Hume a much richer
diversity of types of mental states besides the descriptive and the directive, including all sorts of different
projectable stances and mental dispositions.
43 Another way, which I do not quite know how to categorize, is to follow Yalcin’s treatment of claims of
probability and epistemic modality (see especially Yalcin, , ). He replaces the traditional Humean
distinction between descriptive and directive thoughtswith a distinction betweenmental states representing
the world as being one way or another (modelable as conditions on worlds) and second-order properties of
one’s first-order representational states (not modelable conditions on worlds but rather as a function from
sets of worlds). In a similar vein but within a dynamic framework, Charlow (forthcoming) distinguishes
between information-carrying thoughts and thoughts that are instructions to “test” one’s overall belief and
preference state for certain structural features.Themore general idea behind Yalcin’s and Charlow’s versions
of expressivism is that there may be declarative sentences whose function is not to express representational
beliefs, nor to express desire-like states, but rather to coordinate on a higher-order property of one’s global
mental state, e.g. credence distributions and preference orderings. Depending on how these are related
to inferential commitments, this too might constitute a useful ally with rather than competitor with the
inferentialist view sketched above.
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Early expressivists were, I think, tempted to say that the mental states expressed by
normative sentences are not thoughts with normative content; rather, all content is
representational but we can have nonrepresentational attitudes towards such content
(e.g. we can desire that stealing be less common). Then normative sentences were
treated as conventional and canonical means for expressing such attitudes. If we pro-
ceed this way, expressivists could insist on a purely representationalist conception of
mental content, but argue that it’s not the content of but the type of attitude that makes
amental state nonrepresentational. However, I think it is wildly implausible to say that
there are no thoughts with normative content (what then is one doubting, assuming,
hoping, etc., when one doubts, assumes, hopes, etc. that stealing is wrong?).44
Another way expressivists could go at this point is to apply something akin to
the sort of inferentialist account of content I sketched above to the case of mental
content.45 If this is right, the ideationalist conception of truth conditions might be
correct as far as it goes, but the inferentialist view would be providing a deeper
explanation of what content is in virtue of which sentences have the meaning that
they do.
 Conclusion
As I see things, the key issue between representationalists, inferentialists, and ideation-
alists is one about order of theoretical priority. Everyone should agree that some
sentences describe things in our environment, that most sentences have inferential
connections to other sentences, and that all sentences are vehicles by which we express
our minds. The interesting question is which of these is most theoretically basic for
understanding that in virtue of which sentences have the contents that they have.
Here I have argued that each of these views can accept the predictions that truth-
conditionalist approaches to compositional semantics give for ‘ought’; in effect that
it is a modal operator that quantifies over possibilia at which it evaluates embedded
contents. Given this, I think we can take representation as the master concept and
argue that these truth conditions reveal that ought-claims don’t describe how things
actually are but rather how things are with respect to possible worlds and possible
norms. But we might also take inference as the master concept and argue that these
truth conditions reveal that ought-claims are not ways of encoding a representation
of modal space but rather ways of explicating inferential relations standing between
other things we can say. It’s tempting to see the resulting inferentialist view in the
lineage of expressivism. And I’ve suggested that there may be sophisticated forms
44 Because of this, I think appealing to off-the-shelf Fodorian (, ) or Millikanian () or
Dretskean (, ) accounts of mental content is not going to work for expressivists, since these all
proceed in terms of representation relations between concepts and reality, whereas expressivists need
something different for normative concepts. Moreover, I suspect going in this direction opens expressivists
up to Dorr’s () wishful-thinking challenge.
45 See Blackburn () for an expressivist who ends up moving in the direction of inferentialism.
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of expressivism that are naturally allied with inferentialism about ‘ought.’ However,
it’s important to the way I am thinking of inferentialism that inferential connections
rather than conventional expressive potentials are most fundamental.This is the idea
that I want to recommend as an interesting metasemantic account of that in virtue of
which ought-sentences have the truth-conditional content that they do, which I see as
providing new foundations for a form of antidescriptivism that has often been ignored
in metanormative theory.46
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